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Maritime Trade in War. By Lord Eustace Percy. New Haven,
Published for the Institute of Politics by Yale University
Press, 1930. pp. 114. $2.
THIS is quite a remarkable book. It consists of six lectures delivered at
the Williamstown Institute of Politics by a distinguished Englishman-
lectures in which he undertakes, in a broad sweep, to analyze and explain
,the legal relations between belligerents and neutrals in time of war, and
-to propose possible solutions for the present conflict of views. Recogniz-
ing what he claims to be confusion and uncertainty in the subject and
the fact that the United States and Great Britain seem to entertain dif-
ferent views upon it, he undertakes to discuss the policies and justifica-
tions which led to the adoption of the British practices in the late war and
indicates how far these might be modified in the future. Without once
explaining to the reader the underlying reasons for the whole structure
of maritime law in this respect, namely, the distinction between combatant
and non-combatant and the necessity for a working compromise between
belligerent military and neutral trading privileges, he presents what in
the main must be regarded as a defense of the British practices in the
late war as the natural and presumably lawful outcome of the "logic" of
the existing rules-practices which the British Government, during the
War, did not venture to excuse on any other ground than that of retal-
iation for enemy illegality. He freely admits that Great Britain by these
measures-which in fact ultimately wiped out any neutral rights-con-
trolled the trade of the world; but he suggests that she would not resort
to these extremes in an ordinary war, but only in an extraordinary war
(p. 49). He intimates that the solution of the question of freedom of the
seas in the future lies in a distinction to be made between just wars and
unjust wars-the "just" belligerent to have a fairly free hand which
neutrals shall concede, the "unjust" belligerent to be greatly restricted.
Presumably if one cannot tell which is the "just" side-and that would
be in most cases-the objective law shall prevail. Lord Percy is not im-
pressed with the practicality of League wars against aggressors or with
the possibility of abolishing the status of neutrality. He admits that
the conflict (which he occasionally seems to consider, though it is be-
lieved incorrectly, one between the continental view and the Anglo-Amerl-
can view) must be settled before a new war breaks out. But he concedes
that an international conference would not be appropriate because it
would probably make matters worse, and suggests that the better mode
of procedure would be for private groups of experts, first an Anglo-Ameri-
can group, endowed with a statesmanlike outlook, to undertake drafts of
proposed rules to be submitted for consideration to governmental bodies
and public opinion, in order thus to accomplish the desired end with the
least friction. He does not think that the United States and Great Britain
would easily submit differences which arise in actual cases to an interna-
tional tribunal until an agreement on the rules has been reached.
The argument of the book is fundamentally influenced by certain miscon-
ceptions which make its assumptions and conclusions unacceptable and
even jeopardize any international understanding on the question. The
learned author seems to believe that inasmuch as the law accords a bel-
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ligerent the right to "blockade" and to seize contraband, therefore, if hard
pressed the belligerent can in "logic" use any measures he sees fit
to keep goods from reaching his enemy, whether directly or indirectly,
and can extend at will the contraband lists because anything might be of
use to the enemy military plans. He thus explains why the British Gov-
ernment in the late war felt obliged by Orders-in-Council to prevent any
goods, particularly foodstuffs, from reaching even neutral countries whence
they might find their way into Germany, notwithstanding the fact that
neutral traders had a perfect legal right not only to send these goods
into neutral countries, but even directly into belligerent countries. The
author seems to believe that the certainty of no trade at all is better for the
neutral than the uncertainty as to what the belligerent will permit. The
law-which is by no means so uncertain as the author seems to thinz-
has developed through several hundred years a protection for non-com-
batants against starvation, except by a prescribed type of limited blockade,
and protection for neutrals of their right to trade in non-military goods
even with belligerents. Blockade is a strictly limited military measure of
investing a port, analogous to land siege. With such a specific siege or
blockade, neutrals may not interfere. Lord Percy at times seems to believe
that blockade looks only to a -whole coast, and that as this was impossible
to the British in the case of Germany, they were therefore justified in
adopting other measures to achieve the same end. He does not concede
that these "measures of blockade" were illegal, though Jefferson in 1793
and Wilson in 1915 correctly so characterized them. The author admits
that the "measures" were an economic weapon against the civilian popu-
lation, though at times he defends them on the ground that the goods thus
kept out of Germany might have reached military forces. Goods always
might reach military forces, but that never has justified the exclusion of
any except admittedly military goods, such as munitions and their ana-
logues. To justify the seizure of goods conditionally contraband (like food-
stuffs) their specific destination for military forces had to be not merely
possible, but absolutely proved. Non-combatants also eat. Like Sir Samuel
Evans, Lord Percy does not see the 'logical" distinction between absolute
contraband and goods "conditionally contraband." The emphasis on "logic"
in this examination of the subject indicates fundamental misconceptions.
The compromise between belligerent rights and neutral rights, of which
this distinction is a part, was not logical but practical, and thenceforward
became law, which both belligerent and neutral must strictly observe. It
is true that the contraband list has never been fully agreed on; the author
seems to believe that, by using the privilege of extending the contraband
list, the British Government legally escaped the restrictions placed on
blockade, and contraband as well. It is hard to defend such a position. The
mere fact that no agreement on the contraband list exists does not justify
the inclusion of foodstuffs and hundreds of other articles never deemed of
primary military use or justify the abolition of the distinction between
goods absolutely and goods only conditionally contraband.
The argument that the late war was an exceptional war because all the°
enemy population -was enlisted in it, that the enemy government controlled
the food and other supplies, and that the enemy was a particularly un-
righteous one was exactly the argument that Washington and Jefferson
refused to admit as an alleged justification for similar illegal practices in,
1793. Time has not made the argument more valid. The United States
submitted to the British blacklist before 1917, but, strange to say, Canada"
did not; and' Canada was right. So long as British spokesmen undertake
to maintain the validity of the unheard-of practices adopted in the late-
war, even though coupled with a promise of self-restraint in employn
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them, there is little possibility of an understanding between the United
States and Great Britain. In this connection, it is well to observe that the
1927 agreement for the settlement of American neutrality claims against
Great Britain indicates the rift by the provision "that the right of each
Government to maintain in the future such position as it may deem ap-
propriate with respect to the legality or illegality under international law
of measures such as those giving rise to [the neutrality] claims is fully
reserved, it leing specifically understood that the juridical position of
neither Government is prejudiced by the present arrangement." It would
be unfortunate if this supposed irreconcilability should tend to become a
reality and if the British Government should continue to prefer to conceive
itself as a potential belligerent rather than a potential neutral. The author
makes no reference to the Swedish settlement, and probably similar settle-
ments with other neutral countries, by which Great Britain paid damages
for the injuries inflicted by some of its measures, and thereby presumably
implicitly admitted their illegality. Great secrecy attaches to these settle-
:ments, which the British Government should lift. The author's suggestion
that between just wars and unjust wars there is a distinction which should
produce a difference in the reciprocal rights of belligerents and neutrals
is hardly practical, it is believed; it would only increase the propaganda
and tend to drag neutrals into the conflict, because partiality is the easy
road to belligerency, and because not all neutrals may take the same view
as to which is the "just" side in any particular war.
One cannot better indicate the author's misconceptions on the relation
of logic to law and the effect of "logic" on the respective rights of belliger-
ents and neutrals as built up through the centuries than to quote from
John Bassett Moore's review of Mr. Hyde's International Law:
"The simple truth is that the distinction between what in very recent
years has, inaccurately and unfortunately, been styled 'conditional contra-
band,' and articles absolutely contraband, never did rest on logic, in the
sense that it was imagined that 'conditional contraband,' which includes
food stuffs, was not of military value, potentially even of capital military
value, to belligerents. Not to cover a wider range, one need not be at a
loss for examples, during the past three hundred years, of situations in
which the question of food supply was of capital importance in war. And
yet, did anyone at the time ever imagine that foodstuffs imported into a
belligerent country were not immediately available for military purposes,
or that the government of such country could not or would not take and use
for its own purposes all foodstuffs, whether imported or of domestic origin,
which it might need? That such a supposition was ever indulged, is alto-
gether incredible. The rule, so forcibly stated by Lord Salisbury during the
Boer War, that 'foodstuffs, with a hostile destination can be considered
contraband of war only if they are supplied for the enemy's forces,' and
that 'it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used,' but that
it 'must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of the
seizure,' was not framed as a logical reconciliation of the right to trade,
-with a supposed belligerent right to seize whatever might be used by the
,enemy for the purposes of the war. If framed in this sense, the rule would
]have made a lauglhing stock of logic. In reality the rule represented and has
continued to represent not a logical reconciliation of, but a practical com-
promise between two claims either of which, if carried to its logical con-
clusion, would have destroyed the other, being in this particular like most
other legal rules; and it further represented and represents the advance
-ainfully made, through centuries of struggle, toward greater freedom of
commerce in time of war.
"Is the recent great war to differ in its effects from previous great wars,
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in that extraordinary measures which hard pressed belligerents as the
struggle grew more intense, adopted generally on the professed ground of
retaliation, are to be considered as having changed the established law, and
as having created in its stead a system essentially based on the concession
of belligerent pretensions? Is there reason to believe that the recent war
will differ in this respect from the wars growing out of the French Revolu-
tion and the Napoleonic Wars, whose decrees and orders in council were
regarded twenty years later only as the passing expedients of a contest
desperately waged? Is it more likely now than it was a hundred or two
hundred years ago that nations will find their general and continuing in-
terests to be in accord with what they did in an exceptional exigency?" 1
New Haven, Conn. EDWIN l. BORCHARD.
Cases and Other Materials on Credit Transactions. By Wesley
A. Sturges. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1930. pp. xi, 1228.
$6.50.
THIS casebook is a new grouping, from the functional approach, of mate-
rials customarily covered in courses on mortgages, suretyship and bank-
ruptcy, with the addition of cases on several other topics. The subject
matter is short term rather than investment credit. Of the six chapters
into which the volume is divided the first and second deal with accommoda-
tion contracts,' mortgages, pledges, and conditional sales. Each of these
chapters takes up seriatim (1) the technical contract, (2) consummation
of the credit extension, (3) relations and dealings of the parties during the
period of the credit extension, (4) payment and discharge of the obligation,
(5) extensions and renewals of the obligation, (6) "outlaw" of the obliga-
tion-statutes of limitation, and (7) insolvency and bankruptcy. The sub-
ject of the third chapter is dealers' financing by accommodation contracts,
mortgages, pledges, conditional sales and trust receipts. Chapter four
covers the security holder's use of the credit and security documents.
Chapter five is concerned with the security holder's protection and priorities.
The last chapter is given over to enforcement proceedings, chiefly of mort-
gages. It is interesting to observe ir. Sturges' insistence throughout that
the student consider the technical contract creating the relationships before
considering the incidents of the relationships themselves.
The cases are almost all American, and a great many of them have been
decided in the last twenty years. Many cases are obviously chosen because
either in the statement of facts or in the court's opinion there is an ex-
position of the business situation. Numerous divisions of the book are
introduced by brief extracts from treatises and many cases are followed
by short comments and citations. In this connection the author has in-
serted throughout the book acutely drafted questions intended to enforce a
comparison between the principal case and the cited cases, or between the
principal case and the comments or quotations. The total number of the
author's questions is rather large, although the distribution is so skillful
that the number does not seem excessive. A novel feature is the frequent
inclusion of extracts from law review case notes and comments, often ar-
ranged as a series of divergent views on the same topic. These extracts,
furthermore, are accompanied by copious citations of other law review dis-
cussions. Several recent authors have availed themselves generously of law
review material, but no one has exploited it more thoroughly than Mr.
1 (1923) 23 Cot, L. REv. 84.
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Sturges. An appendix of 133 pages contains the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the Sankruptcy Act, and the uniform statutes on real estate mort-
gages, chattel mortgages, and conditional sales. Each act in the appendix
has a title page of stiff colored paper to facilitate its independent use.
One regrets that limitations of space prevent a detailed analysis of a
typical section of Mr. Sturges' casebook in order to show how shrewdly he
has made each case contribute to his main objectives, and how expertly he
has surrounded these main objectives with an aura of the subtlest and most
controversial matters in the topics studied.
In his choice of subject matter Mr. Sturges has doubtless been influenced
both by his own enthusiasms and by the curricular requirements of his own
law school. One may applaud his purpose and his achievement without
necessarily agreeing with him in every respect. I find myself dissenting
rather curiously in two directions from Mr. Sturges' volume. He concerns
himself only casually with procedural problems; he has no strictly non-legal
quotations, comments, or even citations.
The grand division of substantive and adjective law is a debatable
scheme even for the distribution of material on credit transactions. The
workings of the courts are a proper subject for discussion even under
a functional approach. The creditor's lawyer is often consulted, and
ought to be consulted more, before the credit is extended, but he is also
necessarily concerned much with cases where there is no security at all, or
where, even if security exists, there is a choice of remedies. The decisive
factor in this choice is frequently the relative economy of time and money
afforded by the available remedies. Whether a judgment creditor seeks
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance or asks for a receiver or petitions in
bankruptcy, the substantive law questions may be precisely the same. If
the creditor's lawyer is equipped only with a knowledge of the substantive
law points, his utility may fall considerably short of what the creditor has
a right to expect.
On the other hand, when the lawyer is called in as a business counselor
by one who desires a security set-up, it is not enough for him to know, for
example, the law of trust receipts. It is futile to tell a creditor how to
protect his credit extension if by following the advice further business will
become unprofitable, if not impossible. One cannot tell what business facts
the student will need to know, but one may guess with a certain accuracy
if it is known where the student will practice. Moreover, it is not as im-
portant that the student be fortified with a particular business technique,
as that he sense in advance the sort of technique that is essential to a busi-
ness counselor. Mr. Sturges, so far as his casebook shows, is satisfied that
he has done enough if he chooses cases that will illustrate the modern
scene. It seems to be possible to do even more to correlate the work of the
law school with the all-important practice of the business counselor.
Concretely, it seems an arguable alternative to Mr. Sturges' arrangement
that the division of a course on credit transactions be roughly, but not
completely, into a substantive and an adjective side. On the substantive
side the student would consider such relations as those of broker and cus-
tomer, banker and broker, banker and importer, finance company and motor
car dealer, owner and building contractor, real estate corporation and bond
holder. These relationships could be illustrated either by the frank use
of business materials, as was done in Professor Underhill Moore's rovolu-
tionary bank credit course at Columbia, or by choosing cases arising out
of a limited number of business situations. In terms of law the objec-
tives would be elementary command of the law of pledges, trust receipts,
suretyship, and mortgages. On the adjective side, the student would cover
the enforcement of judgments, receiverships, bankruptcy, and fraudulent
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conveyances with brief excursions into general assignments, creditors' agree-
ments, and commercial arbitration.
Perhaps in the end, whether a student had taken Mr. Sturges' course or
one such as I have outlined, would make no difference to him two years
after graduation. What might make a difference would be whether he bad
taken Mr. Sturges' course or old courses on suretyship and mortgages
designed to fit him for a type of practice that exists only in fond retrospect.
Not that there is anything heedlessly shocking to the conservative in the
new casebook. Mr. Sturges is offering to bridge the gap between radicals
and reactionaries. A resourceful teacher could use it as a basis for the
existing courses on suretyship and mortgages or, with some additions, it
could be utilized by one who believed that a law course might profitably
swallow much of a correlative course in a school of business. Students are
indeed highly privileged who have the opportunity to read this casebook
with a man like Mr. Sturges, who combines so unusually an intimate in-
sider's knowledge of several fields of business activity with the acutest
powers of legal analysis and a capacity for stimulating presentation. His
casebook is a notable contribution to legal pedagogy.
New York City. JOHN HANNA.
Legal Aspects of Commercial Letters of Credit. By Herman N.
Finkelstein. New York, Columbia University Press, 1930.
pp. xxviii, 390. $7.50.
THis volume on the legal aspects of commercial letters of credit, a subject
sorely in need of scholarly exploitation, is presented as the second of a
series of studies on different subjects edited under the auspices of the Fac-
ulty of Law of Columbia University. Not only is this undertaking on thL
part of the law faculty one to be commended in itself, but it constitutes
an excellent introduction to the present volume. In fact, from the author's
generous acknowledgments in the preface, one gathers that the work has
had the benefit of the best thought of the several able commercial lawyers
now and recently at the Columbia Law School.
The main portion of the work, if one may exclude an interesting twenty-
eight page general introduction by Professor Llewellyn, comprises only
two hundred and ninety-five pages, which might seem unduly brief except
for the fact that the subject is relatively new. But even at that there have
been cited in the text something over nine hundred eases, most of which
deal directly with letter of credit questions. There are also thirty-five pages
devoted to modern letter of credit forms, a feature which in itself lends
considerable value to the book.
The organization of material is somewhat illusive, although the work:
starts in a reasonably orthodox manner with a chapter on "History and
Analysis," concerned principally with the different forms of credits and
their uses. This is followed by two chapters dealing with the forms of
action on letters of credit, treated both from a historical point of view
ad with reference to present decisions. Then follow chapters entitled
"Legal Relations Between Respective Parties to Commercial Letter of
Credit Transactions," "Conditions in the Letter of Credit," "The Relation
Between the Letter of Credit and the Sales Contract," "The Measure of
Damage," and a concluding chapter on "The Legal Theory." From a tech-
nical viewpoint, however, the two chapters on the forms of action develop
the author's entire thesis and the remaining chapters, though containing
much important material, are merely by way of amplification.
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The burden of the author's argument is that recovery against the issuing
bank should not be predicated upon an acceptance theory, nor yet upon
ordinary contract principles, but as upon a specialty. The first point was
made some years ago in an article published by the author recommending
the omission of the two sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which make promises to accept the equivalent of acceptance.' The point
that the letter of credit is a mercantile specialty is of more recent origin
and in terms, at least, states a position first taken by the reviewer some
years ago.2
The validity of the author's first contention is perhaps best tested by
considering the measure of the recovery against the issuing bank in the
event it should purport to revoke a so-called "irrevocable" credit of the
type in common use. Although the point is obviously important, it has
not been indexed nor, in fact, has it been adequately treated in the text.
In the chapter on damages it is stated that in case an issuing bank were
to dishonor a properly drawn draft, it would, on the acceptance theory, be
liable for the amount of the drawing plus interest (p. 262). But the
author hastens to prove that if the action were brought on the contract,
additional consequential damages might well be recovered in many cases.
It is then sought to show that recovery against the bank should be governed
by the rules obtaining in suits by sellers versus buyers on C. I. F. contracts
(p. 265).3 The chapter concludes with the statement that "no basis for
the perpetuation of the doctrine of virtual and extrinsic acceptances can be
found."
That this misses the whole import of the word "irrevocable" should be
apparent. Irrevocable surely means something more than that the seller
may go to a foreign country and prove to the satisfaction of a jury what
the extent of his damages may be-as in any sales contract. In no real
sense is the bank a buyer, although it so describes itself in the letter of
credit to lay a foundation for the trust receipt which it may subsequently
take.4 Its obligation is an unqualified promise to honor drawings when
certain conditions have been met, and, as the decisions cited in the text
show, the courts have in many cases enforced this undertaking without
looking to the sales contract, the market value of goods or documents, the
consequential damages, if any, to the seller, or to any other buyer-seller
consideration.
While the author has done some very good work in pointing out the un-
certainties attending the theory that the bank is to be regarded as having
Acceptances and Promises to Accept (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 684.
Comment, Negotiable Instruments-Letters of Credit (1926) 36 YALE
L. J. 245, at 249. The author makes two bare citations of this note without
comment of any sort.
3 See also page 264, note 8, where the author attempts to distinguish the
cases denying the bank's power to revoke and requiring it to pay the face
of the seller's draft by saying that such a result is possible only in cases
of single drawings for the whole amount of the credit, a distinction which
at best would seem to have little point. The one case relied upon for the
application of a C. I. F., seller versus buyer, recovery of damages, however,
did not hold at all that the seller could not recover the face of his drawings,
but only that if he chose not to ship and sued for damages, he could at least
recover compensatory damages. Urguhart, Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank,
[1922] 1. K. B. 318.
4 There is no discussion in the text of trust receipts or of their use in
letter of credit transactions.
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accepted the seller's drafts by its promise to accept them (pp. 140-141),P
it does not follow at all that the general conception of the issuing bank as
an acceptor should be displaced-certainly not by ordinary contract notions
or by unspecified ideas of common law specialties. The reviewer would
prefer to consider that the bank, by issuing the letter of credit, in effect
assumes the position of acceptor on a payment draft drawn by the buyer
to the order of seller.6 Such a view settles questions of damages and revo-
cation quite satisfactorily: the bank in the ordinary case may not revoke
but continues liable for the amount of the seller's drawings, no suit in dam-
ages need be undertaken, and the bank is neither given the buyer's contract
defenses nor subjected to an action for consequential damages. In lieu of
this, the possibility of recovery against the bank on the seller's drafts as
accepted by the bank's promise in its letter of credit should certainly be
retained-at least until ideas concerning the relation of revocation to the
damages question have become more clarified than they as yet appear to be.
There are other points in the work with which the reviewer could cheer-
fully disagree but this discussion is already sufficiently unfair since almost
no mention has been made of the many good points of the book. Not only
is it the only work on the subject, but it shows itself to be the result of a
considerable amount of research and thought. It undoubtedly should be
owned by everyone interested in the law of foreign or domestic trade.
New Haven, Conn. RoscoE TURNER.
Tenure of Office Under the Constitution: A Study in Law and
Public Policy. By James Hart. Baltimore, Johns Hopldns
Press, 1930. pp. ix, 384. $3.50.
THE decision in AMyer v. United States is merely the excuse for this book.
The case is chosen from examples of the traditional technique only as a
particularly timely victim for immolation on the altar of the Scientific
Method. If in the ashes of the sacrifice are found contributions to a better
understanding of the problem of tenure of public office they are but acci-
dental by-products of the ritual. The sacrifice is the thing; and for that
purpose the victim might as well have been the doctrine of mutuality in
equity, or, responsibility for injuries caused by an inherently dangerous
article, in torts.
The Scientific Method to which this book is dedicated is indefinite, in-
describable, tentative. It is known only by Professor John Dewey and
those who know him (p. 4). It is a kind of esoteric empiricism, purged of
the hypostatic fallacy (p. 5), fortified by skepticism (non-cynical), en-
livened by the leaven of pragmatism. Its home is the school of the concret-
ists whose terminology is filled with abstract nouns. In the realm of public
law it calls the Interstate Commerce Commission, "the product of the de-
vising and selecting of variants in the 'block of adjustments' known as
'governmental regulation"' (p. 51). It translates people into a hierarchy
of Publics. It adopts the entomological approach toward governmental
regulation and asks, "Will this prospective, more intensive socialization be
analogous to that of the highest social insects, a condition in which speciali-
5 As the author suggests, it would seem that the requirement that the
bank's promise be unconditional might well be omitted. All that is neces-
sary is that the promise be definite, since it obviously must be conditional,
in a sense, upon proper documents being presented.
6 Supra note 2.
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zation and constraint of the single organism are so extreme that its Inde-
pendent viability is sacrificed to a system of communal bonds just as hap-
pens with the individual cell in the whole organism?" (p. 36). On the matter
of administrative tribunals it poses the question ". . . whether the condi-
tioned reflexes stimulated by the term 'court' and associated stimuli can be
'transferred' to regulatory commissions" (pp. 83-84). Policy in government
must be determined "by its consequences rather than by its deductibility
from the dogma of democracy" (p. 87). So the Scientific Method in
public law proceeds from postulates rather than major premises and fit
length arrives at a constitutional theory.1 The book abounds in abstruse
expositions of methodology, needlessly coined words and phrases, hosts of
inverted commas and parades of modernistic cliches.
Stripped of its verbalism, the author's thesis seems to be: The com-
plexities of modern government demand an increase in the functions of ad-
ministrative triburrals. It is important that administrative tribunals be com-
posed of experts whose efficiency shall not be impaired by preoccupation
arising from uncertainty of tenure and possibility of interference. The
same need is to be found in other governmental bodies. But the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the Myers case has placed an ob-
stacle in the path of this development. It is therefore important to deter-
mine the accuracy of the decision with the hope of limiting its effect upon
future cases. An analysis of the decision depends, of course, upon inter-
pretations of the Constitution, the proceedings in constitutional conventions
and the deliberations of Congress. The sound interpretation is that which
subserves present needs in government. Constitutional data should there-
fore be so construed as to delimit the president's power of removal and to
exalt the function of the legislative branch to the end that future attempts
of Congress to control tenure of administrative offices may be upheld.
It would be idle to deny the basic soundness of Professor Hart's approach.
Students of administrative law, with the possible exception of Lord Chief
Justice Hewart, will support his demand for a realistic, workable interpre-
tation of constitutional provisions. Everyone wants more science in law,
if by that is meant more accurate thinking and rules better designed to
serve the needs of a modern world. But it is to be questioned whether the
end is to be obtained merely by invoking the Prophets of Hypotheses, or
by dwelling solely in the realm of terminology, or by discoursing discur-
sively in legal analysis. It is possible that we need only look for the
simple facts of the law's operation. That may be the much sought scientific
method.
New Haven, Conn. RICHARD JOYCE SITITr.
Law and Practice of Marine Insurance Relating to Collision Dam-
ages and Other Liabilities to Third Parties. By Howard B.
Hurd. London, Effingham Wilson, 1930. pp. xvi, 178. 10s. 6d.
THIS work is a monograph dealing with losses suffered by ship-owners,
cargo owners, crew and passengers through collisions at sea. It treats of
the efforts that have been made to distribute these losses equitably and
economically by rules developed in admiralty, by legislation, international
conventions, and insurance contracts. Its origin was in a course of lectures
delivered by the author before the Glasgow Underwriters' Association Stu-
dents' Society. The work has the qualities of the purpose for which it was
1 Cf. c. VII, particularly at pp. 272-275.
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written. The requirement of oral delivery before an audience of students
gives the text a certain vividness and dramatic quality which might other-
wise have been missed; but on the other hand the treatment is in places
sketchy and incomplete, and the statements made are inadequately sup-
ported by authorities. Cases referred to in the tex\t are given by title with-
out the customary citations, which are to be had only by a time consuming
reference to the table of cases. The cases in this table number only eighty-
three. One should say, however, that even though the cases cited are so sur-
prisingly few, yet these few are used with marked effect. Indeed, the ines-
capable romance of the seas is faintly apparent, even on the pages of a
legal treatise.
Beginning -with a very brief but very effective r6sum6 of admiralty juris-
diction, the author passes to a summary treatment of the rules that have
been developed in the English court of admiralty for allocating losses re-
sulting from collisions at sea. He brings out with especial clearness those
always interesting rules of admiralty which apportion the liability in cases
where the negligent acts of both parties have contributed to the accident
In so doing, with broad strokes he sketches the development of the perti-
nent rules of maritime law through its strange mingling of international
customs and accepted maritime regulations of great commercial centers,
such as the laws of Oleron, published at Rouen in 1266. We see how the
House of Lords in Hay v. LeNcvel reversing the Scottish Court, and de-
parting from the generally observed rule in the maritime world, held that if
both participants in a collision were at fault, they must necessarily be re-
garded as equally in fault. Then followed the not less surprising doctrine,
finally fixed by the House of Lords in The Stoomvaart MaatschappJ Ncdcr-
land v. The PeninsWlar & Oriental Steam Navigation Co.,2 that under this
rule there did not result cross liabilities whereby each of the participants
in the collision owed to the other one-half of the damage inflicted, but a
single liability owed by the one suffering the smaller damage to the one
upon whom larger damage was inflicted, such liability being measured by
taking one-half of the excess of the one loss over the other. Under this
rule it was held to follow that the then current collision clause in insur-
ance policies did not indemnify the owner of the ship to whom the balance
was thus payable because he had not in fact incurred any liability on ac-
count of the collision. These and other decisions opposed to the practices
of maritime peoples necessitated much legislation and some international
conventions, and attempts at many more that are shown to be sorely needed.
In this connection the book discusses with some fullness the development of
the Merchant Shipping Act, which corresponds in general to our own Harter
Act, from its beginnings in the act of 7 GEo. H, c. 15 (1734), down to the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1921. The most significant portions of this Act,
as well as the very important Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, are set
out in the appendix. The Conventions drafted by the Diplomatic Confer-
ence at Brussels, which sits with powers and purposes very similar to those
of our own Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Legislation, are
discussed very satisfactorily in the last three chapters of the book. These
Conventions, '"Limitation of Ship-Owners' Liability," "Maritime Mortgages
and Liens," and "Immunity of State-Owned Ships," are as yet unratified
except by Belgium.
After showing the varied allocations of collision risks by courts, statutes,
and international conventions, the author then treats with admirable direct-
ness and lucidity the development of the collision clause in marine insur-
12 Shaw's Sc. App. Cas. 395 (1824).
27 App. Cas. 795 (1882).
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ance policies so as to give effect to the intention of the parties in spite, one
is tempted to say, of the unsatisfactory doctrines announced by the courts.
Special attention is given to the collision clause as finally worded and is-
sued by the Institute of London Underwriters now in use throughout the
British world.
As already stated, this little book cites but few English cases. While
occasional fleeting references are made to American practices and legal
doctrines in relation to collision liabilitips, no authorities, either by way of
judicial decision or text-books, are mentioned. The work, therefore, cannot
greatly serve the immediate needs of the American lawyer; but its reading
will undoubtedly clarify his understanding of business practice and judi-
cial decision in Great Britain, which must necessarily be of immediate in-
terest to all Americans engaged in foreign trade.
New Haven, Conn. WILLIAm R. VANCG.
Les 6trangers et la propriMtM commerciale. By Charles E. Rons-
seray. Paris, L. Chauny & L. Quinsac, 1930. pp. 320.
FEw French statutes affecting alien interests have been subjected to more
criticism in recent years than those which were enacted in 1926 and 1927
for the protection of commercial property. Following closely upon the law
of prorogation, whose benefits were reserved for French nationals, they
have evoked extensive litigation, diplomatic protests, and interpretative
statements by the French Government. The problems which the statutes
have thus raised are considered by Dr. Ronsseray in his work under two
heads: first, a study of the statutes themselves with respect to their legis-
lative history and their relation to Article 11 of the French Civil Code,
defining the status of aliens, and the treaties alleged to govern between
France and other states alleged to govern the situation; second, a short
analysis of the comparable legislation in other states with reference to the
requirements of the French statutes.
Holding that the analogous foreign law, whose existence is a condition
precedent to the invocation of these statutes by an alien, need not be an
identical law but rather a similar law whose purpose and results approxi-
mate those of the French enacttnent, the author contends that the English
Landlord and Tenant Act, 17 & 18 GEO. V, c. 36 (1927), is the only anala-
gous statute of which he knows, but that other aliens are entitled to pro-
tection of their commercial property in France by reason of the treaties
existing between their states and France which provide for assimilation
to nationals or for most favored nation treatment in commercial matters.
His reasons for this conclusion are derived from the considerations that
the statutes are in his opinion definitive and not extraordinary postwar
measures whose benefits might properly be confined to French citizens, that
the strict reciprocity required by the judicial interpretation of Article 11 of
the Civil Code is a rule which has ceased to have practical utility, and that
the interpretative statement issued by the French Government on August
13, 1929, which was favorable to alien interests, is binding upon the French
courts.
There are two points of discussion which are of special interest in the
light of other international events: the author's suggestion for the revision
of Article 11 of the Civil Code and his treatment of the treaty-making
powers of the French Executive. He suggests that Article 11 should be
revised to give to the alien all the private rights enjoyed by French citizens
with the exception of those which, in the country of the alien, are by statute
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prohibited to French citizens, and those which, in France, are by statute
expressly reserved to French citizens. It is not without significance that,
while advocating the revision of the Code article governing the status of
aliens and the extension to them of the benefit of the statutes on commer-
cial property, the author does not feel that they should be given complete
assimilation. His discussion of the binding effect of the interpretative
statements of the French Government, issued in answer to inquiries made
by other states, includes a treatment of the treaty-making power which,
though brief, covers deftly and efficiently not only the usual points but also
the efficacy of treaties which have not received the approval of the French
Senate. In this connection Dr. Ronsseray's view that the interpretative
statements are equivalent to a supplementary convention between the states
or the decision of an arbitrator upon the case is perhaps open to debate.
Nevertheless the construction of his case is not without interest.
The second portion of Dr. Ronsseray's discussion is devoted to the study
of comparable legislation in other states with regard to the requirements
of the French statutes. This amounts to little more than the application
of his conclusions to the legislation and treaties which may be invoked
by the nationals of each state when seeking to secure the protection of the
French statutes.
Written entirely from the French point of view and with regard only to
the considerations of municipal law, the book gives a brief critical history
of the statutes on commercial property. It is of particular value because
of the liberal and discriminating use of direct quotations from pertinent
official documents, cases which have been tried in French courts, treaties
whose interpretation is at stake, and foreign statutes. The frank and criti-
cal treatment of the subject by an author who does not hesitate to point
out anti-alien feeling is without too frequent an American counterpart in
related fields.
New Haven, Conn. PHOEBE MORRISON.
The Territorial Sea. By Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y
Sirven. New York, Oxford University Press, 1930. pp. xx,
175.
ALTHOUGH much adverse criticism has been directed at the preparatory
work for the First Conference for the Codification of International Law
which met at The Hague in March, 1930, one of the outstanding results
of the Conference is the large amount of literature on the three subjects
on its agenda which appeared in anticipation of that meeting. Among
the organizations assisting in the preparation of this literature was the
American Institute of International Law. The topic of Territorial Waters
was confided to Judge Antonio de Bustamante and his study is the most
elaborate of those prepared under the auspices of the American Institute.
The study originally issued from the press of the University of Havana
in Spanish, and has likewise appeared in French and German. In the
English version, here under review, the translation is not always too apt,
particularly in the suggested text of articles in the author's draft con-
vention.
The volume is arranged with a view to its utility in serving the end
for which it was prepared. Book I deals with the historical background,
Book II with efforts at codification of the subject, while Book III contains
Judge Bustamante's own contributions to the analysis of the problem and
its solutions. Aside from his authority as a professor, writer and states-
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man, the author's views command particular attention since they are
those of a judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Judge Bustamante effectively points out the essential reality of the ter-
ritorial sea and concludes that each state has "sovereign ownership"
(propredad sober'na), over such waters. His choice of the word "sover-
eign" is made with some reluctance and primarily because it is least of
the evils. He lists tle rights of the coastal state and shows that inter-
national law does not negate this concept of sovereign ownership.
There is detailed treatment of the problems of measurement, including,
those resulting from the situation of islands, rocks, shoals, bays, coves,
river mouths, ports, roadsteads, etc. Judge Bustamante properly recog-
nizes that the answer to these largely geographical questions must neces-
sarily be partly unsatisfactory because of the absence of sufficient
geographical data. For bays he prefers the twelve mile rule. Although
he favors the three-mile limit as the most acceptable in a convention, he
does not believe it is established in international law. In this, the re-
viewer believes, he fails to distinguish between the widely differing juridi-
cal bases of various national claims to more extended zones. Judge
Bustamante endorses a system under which special national claims to par-
ticular areas of sea would be adjudicated before an international tribunal,
As to jurisdiction in the territorial sea, the author logically follows his
premise of sovereignty; but he follows also current treaty practice in
providing that the coastal state will not interfere in matters which do
not affect it. The author's draft convention terminates with the now
usual general provisions covering ratification, interpretation by an inter-
national tribunal, and like matters.
The Hague Conference of last spring having failed to reach an agree-
ment on this subject, Judge Bustamante's' book will continue to serve as
an aid to future efforts to achieve an international convention and at the,
same time will have its place in the permanent literature on the topic.
New York City. PHILP C. JESSUP.
Magna Carta, A Pageamnt Drama. By Thomas Wood Stevens.
Chicago, The American Bar Association, 1930. pp. 80. $1.50.
THis is a successful attempt to use the drama as a means of bringing an
important incident of English constitutional history vividly before'our eyes..
A piece written by the producer of a pageant should not be scrutinized
too narrowly for its historical accuracy. It is enough to say that the author
has found in Chronicle and Plea Roll of the time abundant materials for
dramatic representation. He depicts for us with telling force the traditional
picture of King John, the cruel tyrant, and the universal joy at his sur-
render when he granted Magna Carta. In the foreword, Dean Pound
writes briefly and brilliantly of English law and the significance of Magna
Carta-such a description as a philosopher might give who was thinking
only of the fundamental principles that he believes underlie the tough,
contradictory, and sordid legal details. The result is in the nature of a
panegyric which culminates on a solemn religious note as he says: "The
lawyer is justified in his faith that for another seven hundred years that.
venerable instrument will make for reason and the will of God, as it has
done for seven hundred years in the past."
The format of the book is attractive. Inside the cover is printed a fac-
simile of the Charter. While the characters are clear, they are much too
small for ordinary use, but the reproduction demonstrates in striking
fashion the brevity of the "Great" Charter. The volume also contains a.
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complete translation of the document. Unfortunately, it is printed without
paragraphing-a method which renders the appearance unattractive and
reference to the various articles difficult.
New Haven, Conn. Smwx'y K. Mucmr C T.
A Collection of Natiowity Laws of Various Countries as Con-
tained in Constitutions, Statutes, aiud Treaties. Edited by
Richard W. Flournoy, Jr. and Manley 0. Hudson. New York,
Oxford University Press, 1929. pp. xxiii, 776. $4.
UNDERTAKEN in preparation for the recent Codification Conference at The
Hague, this compilation of nationality laws of all countries, including cer-
tain multilateral and bilateral treaties which affect the municipal law, is
the most exhaustive yet published. Earlier compilations such as those by
Lehr, Schwartz, Mangus, and those published in several Parliamentary
Papers, do not approach it in exhaustiveness nor, so far as the observer
can judge, in accuracy. The editorial notes and the bibliographies under
each country add much to the value of the work. In its preparation, the
editors had the assistance of competent officials in the Department of State,
who not only assembled the statutes, but also supervised the trans-
lations. In a subject where new statutes are promulgated constantly, par-
ticularly since 1919, it is probable that such a compilation rapidly goes
out of date. But any one who has attempted to assemble the statutory law
of foreign countries on any subject will appreciate the magnitude of the
editors' task and the skill 'with which it has been performed. Although
the original texts are not reproduced, it may be assumed that the same
editorial care was employed to insure accuracy of translation as is evident
in other respects. Administrative regulations, carrying the statutes into
effect, are usually omitted, probably intentionally. The analytical index
at the end is of decided value; on the basis of the laws reprinted, even more
accessible information, on the order of Magnus' comparative data, could
be tabulated.
E. 'A. B.
Die Bereicherungshaftang imn, anglo-amerikanischen Rcchtskircis
in Vergleichkung nit dent deutsckhen biirgerlicliea Recht. By
Wolfgang Friedmann. Berlin & Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter
& Co., 1930. pp. 148.
Die Haftung des Verkdvers einer fremden beweglichen Sache in
den Vereinigten Staaten von Agnerika ia Verglcichung mit dent
deutschen birgerlichen Recht. By John Wolff. Berlin &
Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1930. pp. 83.
Bibliographie der redlhtsverglelchenden Literatzur des Zivil- mid
Handelsrechktes in Zentral- und Westeuropa. und in den Ver-
einigten Staaten von Agnerik 1870-1928. By Erich-Hans
Kaden. Berlin, Franz Vahlen, 1930. pp. xvi, 295. RM. 12.
THE first two titles, originally written as dissertations for the degree of
Doctor of Laws at the Universities of Berlin and Heidelberg, respectively,
appear as monographs published by the Institute for Foreign Law and
Private International Law which 'was founded at the University of Berlin
in 1926. The first deals with the Anglo-American and German law of
quasi-contracts, and the second, with the Anglo-American and Germp-r, 'aw
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of warranties in the law of sales. The third title is an excellent bibliog-
raphy relating to the civil and commercial law of central and western
Europe and of the United States for the years 1870-1928, prepared by E.
H. Kaden, Professor of Comparative Civil Law at the University of Geneva
with the collaboration of the Berlin Institute referred to. Besides under-
taking a comprehensive comparative study of the law of obligations, the
Institute proposes to issue a series of monographs relating to the law of
corporations, bankruptcy and stock exchange transactions. An interesting
and novel feature of the Institute's program is that special emphasis is to
be placed upon the law of the United States. Beginning with 1927, the
Institute has published also a review devoted to foreign law and private
international law, which, from a practical and scientific point of view,
greatly excels all others in the field.
Public Utility Control in Massachusetts. By Irston R. Barnes.
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930. pp. x, 239. $3.
ORIGINALLY designed as a critical estimate of the prudent investment
theory, Mr. Barnes' book developed into a case-study of public utility
control in a jurisdiction which differs notably from other jurisdictions in
commission procedure and result. The situation in Massachusetts is in
many respects unique. Instead of undertaking a valuation of the property
of a utility company, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
determines the rate base in accordance with a theory that enables it to dis-
regard the rulings of the United States Supreme Court on fair value and
reproductive cost. Yet appeals to the Federal courts have been infrequent,
the first one occurring only as late as 1927. These, factual peculiarities
serve to present the question of public utility control in clearer form than
usual.
With the exception of the last two chapters, Mr. Barnes' treatment
of the subject is historical. The development of reguiatory machinery,
control of the security issues, and regulation of rates are taken up in turn.
In the last two chapters, the author emphasizes the individual features of
the Massachusetts control and suggests possible alterations. The book is a
dispassionate presentation of valuable historical material in lucid, exposi-
tory form. The research has been comprehensive, the work is carefully
documented, and there is a complete, serviceable index. The last chapters,
addressing themselves to a consideration of variant theories, while on the
whole impartial, are necessarily confined to a brief treatment of highly
controversial questions.
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